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vLLM uses Python 3.12 built-in hash() which leads to predictable hash collisions in prefix cache

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 6, 2025 in vllm-project/vllm • Updated Feb 6, 2025

Package

pip vllm (pip)

Affected versions

< 0.7.2

Patched versions

0.7.2

Description

Summary

Maliciously constructed statements can lead to hash collisions, resulting in cache reuse, which can interfere with subsequent responses and cause unintended behavior.

Details

Prefix caching makes use of Python's built-in hash() function. As of Python 3.12, the behavior of hash(None) has changed to be a predictable constant value. This makes it more feasible that someone could try exploit hash collisions.

Impact

The impact of a collision would be using cache that was generated using different content. Given knowledge of prompts in use and predictable hashing behavior, someone could intentionally populate the cache using a prompt known to collide with another prompt in use.

Solution

We address this problem by initializing hashes in vllm with a value that is no longer constant and predictable. It will be different each time vllm runs. This restores behavior we got in Python versions prior to 3.12.

Using a hashing algorithm that is less prone to collision (like sha256, for example) would be the best way to avoid the possibility of a collision. However, it would have an impact to both performance and memory footprint. Hash collisions may still occur, though they are no longer straight forward to predict.

To give an idea of the likelihood of a collision, for randomly generated hash values (assuming the hash generation built into Python is uniformly distributed), with a cache capacity of 50,000 messages and an average prompt length of 300, a collision will occur on average once every 1 trillion requests.

References

References

@russellb russellb published to vllm-project/vllm Feb 6, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 6, 2025
Reviewed Feb 6, 2025
Last updated Feb 6, 2025

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

No CWEs

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-rm76-4mrf-v9r8

Source code

Credits

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